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Abstract:  
The paper identifies a condition under which favouritism is beneficial to the principal even when 
the favoured agent is selected randomly. This paper also characterizes how the optimal incentive 
scheme changes in presence of random favouritism. Using a moral hazard framework with 
limited liability it is shown that in presence of favouritism principal can optimally decrease 
monetary incentive when the potentially favoured group size is small. Inspite of a fall in optimal 
effort the paper predicts that favouritism can emerge as an optimal outcome when return of the 
firm is low.  
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1. Introduction: 
Favouritism is considered to be an evil within an organization. Yet it persists and has serious 
economic consequences. This preferential bias of the principal, leading to inefficient decision 
taking and the consequent loss in productivity of the agent has been the major area of concern in 
the recent studies. In contrast to the usual discussion on favouritism, presented in organizational 
literature this paper identifies the condition under which favouritism is beneficial for the 
principal even when she prefers any agent randomly. The paper also explores how the optimal 
incentive scheme changes in presence of favouritism. Here, we have used a modified moral 
hazard framework with limited liability1 a la Innes (), Besley and Ghatak (2008) among others to 
show how the optimal incentive structure changes in presence of random favoritism. By random 
favouritism we mean that the principal is impartial (in a way) as she does not have a pre-
determined preferential bias for any particular agent. The principal selects an agent randomly 
from the potentially favoured group of homogenous agents. To some extent similar kind of an 
idea of favouritism has been used in Chen (2010). In his model agents has common knowledge 
that they are ex-ante equally likely to be favoured and nature plays the role of selecting the 
favoured agent by tossing of a coin. Chen (2010) has termed this as explicit favouritism which is 
very similar to the concept of ‘random favouritism’ that we use in this paper. We find that 
favouritism can be an optimal outcome for the principal if the return of the firm is sufficiently 
low. Like, Bramoullé and Goyal (2009) and Breuer et al. (2011), this paper asserts that 
favouritism is relatively easier to sustain in smaller groups, but together with that the return of 
the firm has to be low for favouritism to be beneficial to the principal. Thus, the paper generates 
an interesting result where return of the firm plays a pivotal role for existence of favouritism in 
an organization.  
               Favouritism is often considered as an obvious outcome of subjective performance 
evaluation2 which happens to be the best measure when objective performance measure becomes 
difficult to execute. Again, emergence of favouritism in the form of depriving an agent outside a 
network and thus, leading to inefficient decision making in the organization has gained attention 
                                                           
1
 We have assumed the agent to be risk neutral so that favouritism does not get misinterpreted as an outcome of the 
agent’s attitude towards risk. 
2
 See Prendergast (2002) 
in recent studies3. Unlike these whole lots of papers, in this paper favouritism emerges when the 
favoured agent is offered with higher appraisal even when the outcome of the project is 
unsuccessful. Thus, the selected agent enjoys an undue advantage. But ex-ante agents know that 
they face equal probability of being selected as the favoured one as the principal selects the agent 
randomly from the homogenous pool of potentially favoured agents4. Similar to Prendergast and 
Topel (1996), Prendergast (2002) and Berger et al. (2011), we assume that the principal gains an 
additional utility from indulging in favouritism. This gain from favouritism can account from an 
ex-ante expected side payment from the selected agent or from the reduced cost which otherwise 
would have been spent on performance evaluation or can even account for psychological 
pleasure out of an ex-ante expected gratitude from the favoured agent. Fixing this idea, the 
optimal contract derived in presence of favouritism suggests that though the optimal effort falls 
with degree of favouritism the principal can optimally reduce monetary incentive when the 
favoured group size shrinks. Thus, favouritism acts an additional incentive which helps in 
reducing the burden on incentive bonus.  
           Inspite of the adverse impact of favouritism, which has been well documented in both 
empirical as well as experimental works5, our paper contributes to the literature on positive view 
of favouritism. Prendergast and Topel (1996), in their seminal paper, have argued that 
favouritism can benefit an organization because of the utility that the principal derives from 
exercising bias. Kwon (2006) has shown that favouritism arises from within the firm decisions. It 
does not arise only due to preferential bias of the principal as shown by Prendergast and Topel 
(1996). If the principal does not execute her bias for an agent then also favouritism emerges as an 
optimal outcome by reducing the cost of searching the agent with best idea to implement. This 
paper borrows this view of favouritism and shows that even if principal does not exhibit directive 
preferential bias, she can gain from indulging in some form i.e. random favouritism. Yet, unlike 
Kwon (2006), favouritism is not endogenous in this paper. Viewed in terms of value of timing 
option, Arya and Glover (2003) have argued that favouritism is beneficial since it provides 
appropriate incentives to the unfavoured agents by reducing their option value of waiting.  
                                                           
3
 For instance see Pérez-González (2006), Kramarz and Skans (2007), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Bandiera et al. 
(2009). 
4
 They might belong to a network, influential or otherwise.  
5
 For instance see Laband and Piette(1994),  Ittner et al.(2003), Garicano,  Palacios-Huerta and Prendergast(2005), 
Rickman and  Witt(2006),  Breuer et al.(2010), Berger et al.(2011) 
 
                The rest of the paper is arranged in the following manner: To start with Section 2 
constructs the benchmark model without favouritism which is a simplified version of Besley and 
Ghatak (2008) where the optimal monetary incentive structure in derived in presence of status 
incentives. Random favouritism is introduced in Section 3. Finally Section 4 provides concluding 
remarks and throws some light on future works. 
  
2. The Benchmark model: 
Let us assume that a firm consists of a risk neutral principal and a risk neutral status conscious 
agent. The principal hires the agent to carry out a project. The project can either succeed or fail. 
The agent puts effort denoted by   0,1  which can be taken as the probability of success of 
the project. Therefore the project can succeed with probability  and fail with probability 1    
and this is in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. The effort of the agent is costly and 
the cost of effort is given by 	


 . If the project succeeds it generates a payoff   0 and zero 
otherwise. The stochastic part of the principal’s payoff is unobservable and also not third party 
verifiable. Since the outcome of the project is non-verifiable; it is not ex-post incentive 
compatible for the principal to reward the agent even when the project succeeds and therefore it 
weakens the ability of the principal to structure an incentive scheme which can overcome the 
moral hazard problem. However, there exists a weakly informative and contractible signal 
σ  0,1 on which contracts can be conditioned where σ  1 is ‘good news’ and σ  0 is ‘bad 
news’. Let  be the probability that the project is a success conditional on the signal being σ. 
Put differently  is the probability that the project is successful conditional on the signal being 1 
and  is the probability that the project is successful conditional on the signal being 0. We 
assume that the signal is weakly informative in the sense that   . When    1  and 
  0  the signal is perfectly informative. Since the contract is conditioned upon , the 
monetary payoff 1 is offered to the agent with probability   1|    1   
and 0 is paid with probability   0|  1    1  . The following table 
explicitly explains the conditional probability of success under different situations6. 
                                                           
6
 For more on weakly informative signals refer to Laffont and Martimort (2001).  
           Effort   0   1 
σ  1   
σ  0 1   1   
 
We assume that the principal also confers status (positional good) to the agent in case he 
produces high output. In line with Besley and Ghatak (2008) we assume that offering the 
positional good can in principle be conditioned on  rather than just on . We also assume that 
conferring status is almost costless to the principal. Deviating from Besley and Ghatak (2008) we 
assume that the agent gains a constant utility from status which is denoted by  07.  
For the sake of simplicity we assume that the outside option of the agent is zero. We assume that 
the agent has no wealth, thus a limited liability constraint operates.  
As a benchmark, at first we consider the first- best case where effort is observable and hence 
contractible. To find out the first best effort level we maximize the expected joint surplus of the 
principal and the agent. Therefore under the first-best the optimization problem becomes 
!"#	$, %&      	


                                                                                             (1) 
Therefore, the optimal first best effort will be ̂()      and we assume that    * 1 to 
focus on the interior solution. Now we look into the case where effort is unobservable and hence 
non-contractible. To obtain the optimal contract under unobservability we have to perform the 
following optimization exercise. 
!"#  +,    -1  0  1  0  0 (2) 
subject to the following constraints: 
a) Limited liability constraint requiring that the agent be left with a non negative level of 
wealth : 
     1  0, 0  0                                                                                                       (3)    
                                                           
7
 In contrast to Besley and Ghatak (2008) the agent’s utility from status remains unaffected by fractions of other 
workers receiving status. Thus, we have assumed away the disutility factor accounting from crowding out effect.   
Signal 
b) Individual Rationality constraint stating that for participation in the job it is necessary 
that the agent is offered at least her outside option (reservation utility) 
+.  -1  0  1  0  0  	


     0         (4) 
c) Incentive compatibility constraint which shows that the effort level maximizes the 
private payoff of the agent: 
         e =  "/01"#	$,  -1  0  1  0  0  	


    
After simplification the incentive compatibility constraint can be written as 
       &    -1  0     (5) 
where &   0,1. Since the outside option is sufficiently low, therefore participation constraint  
will not bind in this case8. The assumption of risk neutrality along with limited liability makes 
the incentive compatibility constraint costly and hence gives rise to moral hazard incentive for 
the agent. Also observe that 0  0 is the relevant limited liability constraint and the other one 
is a slack constraint. Now substituting the incentive compatibility constraint in the principal’s 
utility function, the optimization exercise becomes 
!"# +,    -1  0  -1  0  1  1  0 
subject to 
Limited liability constraint: 0  0 
The principal will maximize her expected utility to determine the optimal contract which can 
be stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: 
I. The optimal payments are characterized as follows 
a) 0  0 
b) 1   34565783
    when    
78
3  
                                                           
8
 It is also possible, though cumbersome to extend this model when the outside option is high such that the 
participation constraint binds.  
0 otherwise 
II. The corresponding optimal effort level is given by 
&    -1  
III. The corresponding expected utility of the principal can be written as follows 
+,  3456578


93
    
The first part of the proposition gives the optimal incentive scheme. It shows that it is optimal for 
the principal to set the bonus at minimum level when the signal is bad since decreasing 0  
would increase the effort and hence will increase the expected payoff of the principal at the same 
time. When the signal is good it is worthwhile for the principal to pay a positive amount to the 
agent only if     783 . On the contrary if the utility from status is sufficiently high in the sense 
    783  then the principal need not offer any financial incentive to elicit costly effort from the 
agent. Put differently increased   leads to a fall in 0 and therefore presence of status as an 
incentive relaxes the burden on financial incentive as a tool for the principal to elicit costly 
effort. Given   firms with higher profits are likely to offer positive financial incentives even in 
the presence of status as an incentive. Also noteworthy is the fact that when the signals are more 
informative i.e. when  : 0 the condition     783  is likely to hold and therefore this 
condition always holds.  Thus, the return of the firm is always greater than the utility from status. 
But if the condition does not hold then it is not optimal for the principal to offer any positive 
amount of incentive pay. The second part of the proposition tells us that the optimal effort level 
is always less than the first best since ∆1 *  . Moreover even when the condition for 
positive payment does not hold the agent elicits positive effort because of the presence of utility 
from status incentive. The final part of the proposition gives the optimal payoff of the principal 
and one can easily check that <=
>
<6 
4?6
 
78
∆  0.  
 
3. Random Favouritism: 
The benchmark model explained above basically shows how the use of status incentive reduces 
the burden on monetary payments. Thus, it provides the optimal incentive structure in presence 
of status incentive. But this framework ex-ante implicitly assumes that the principal evaluates9 
the performance of the agent perfectly before disbursing incentive to the deserving agent. In this 
section we depart from this assumption and incorporate the fact that the principal indulge herself 
into the act of favouritism10 while providing appraisal to the agent, yet it is random in nature.  
By random favouritism we mean that the principal does not follow any specified rule to choose 
her favourite agent from the group of homogenous agents. It is assumed that each agent of the 
group faces a probability @11 of being picked as the favourite one. Thus, the group consists of the 

A number of identical potentially favoured agents. An increase in @ implies that the size of the 
favoured group shrinks, which in turn indicates an increase in the number of agents outside the 
group12. Thus, degree of favouritism increases with the increase in the parameter µ [0,1). 
Therefore, now onwards, in this paper, we term a change in µ as a change in the degree of 
favouritism. It is further assumed that @ is common knowledge. Since favouritism is random 
therefore the probability of being selected as the favoured one is independent of the effort that 
the agent puts in the production process. We assume that the principal involves in favouritism in 
providing appraisal to the agent, which consists of a combination of status as well as monetary 
incentive. Thus, favouritism is incorporated in the model via two channels; monetary incentive, 
1 and status incentive . In this scenario, the agent will receive 1 under two mutually 
exclusive events (i) if the signal is good and (ii) if the signal is bad but the agent is selected as 
the favourite one. Thus the probability of the agent receiving 1 is   1    @1 
  1   when the informative signal is independent of the probability of being 
selected as favourite one. Thus now the agent enjoys an increased probability of the amount 
@1    1   to receive 1 and this captures favouritism in the case of receiving 
the monetary incentive. Similarly, 0 is given out only in the event when the signal is bad and 
the agent is not picked as the favourite one, that is, with probability of 1  @1   
1  . Thus, the agent faces a lower probalibity of receiving the low level bonus of amount 
                                                           
9
 It should be mentioned that for many of the cases an objective performance evaluation becomes too costly and 
sometimes even impossible (See Murphy and Cleveland (1995), Prendergast (1999))  
10
 Favouritism is often an outcome of subjective performance evaluation (See Prendergast (2002)) which is 
considered as the best measure where objective performance measures fails to work. 
11 µ  0,1 can also be interpreted as preference parameter.  
12
 It should be noted that unfavoured agents are not captured in the model. So, the unfavoured agents can represent 
the deprived lot existing within the firm or can also represent the agents belonging outside the firm. Thus, even 
when we extend the logic to outside the firm, the results of the model holds through. 
0. Again as assumed in the previous section, since status is costless to the principal, it can in 
principle be conditioned just on  rather than on . But now an agent can acquire status even 
when the outcome of the project is poor, if she is favoured. Therefore in this structure status is 
conditioned on  as well as on @. Status is now conferred under two independent situations (i) 
when the project is successful and (ii) when the agent is favoured and the project is unsuccessful. 
In the above mentioned two cases, the second situation captures favouritism and hence, the 
probability of attaining status now increases to  @1  .Thus, @1   is the increased 
probability of receiving status out of favouritism. Similar to Prendergast and Topel (1996), 
Prendergast (2002), Berger et al. (2011) the principal receives a utility from executing 
favouritism of the amount C113, where C  0,1,signifies the amount of benefit that the 
principal gain from favouring an agent. One interpretation of this increased utility from 
favouritism can be an ex-ante expected side payment made by the favoured agent or from the 
reduced cost which otherwise would have been spent on performance evaluation or can even 
account for psychological benefit which the principal enjoys from the ex-ante expected gratitude 
which the selected agent is expected to shower on the principal. 
Given this structure, the expected utility of the principal written as  
+(,    1  @-1   0  1  @  @1  0  0  C1 
whereas, the  expected payoff of the agent is written in the following expression 
+(.  1  @-1   0  1  @  @1  0  0 

2
   @1   
The optimal effort which the agent chooses by maximizing her expected payoff is ̂F& 
1  @-1   0   . Thus, this is the incentive compatible effort level. Substituting 
the optimal effort in the expected utility function of the principal we get the modified optimizing 
exercise as follows 
 
!"# +(,  1  @-1   0    1  @-1  0  1  @
 @1  0  0  C1 
subject to 
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 The utility that the principal receives is Maxδb1, δb0   δb1 since b1  b0 . 
Limited liability constraint: 0  0 
Given this optimization exercise we can state the optimal contract under this situation in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 2: 
I. When the principal indulges in favouritism then the optimal monetary incentive 
scheme is characterized as follows 
a) F1    3455A65783
5A 
A5L
3
5A
  0   when    
78
3 
AM5365AN5L
35A  
                 0                otherwise 
b) F0  0 
II. The corresponding optimal effort level is given by 
̂F&  1  @-1    
 
III. The corresponding expected utility of the principal can be written as follows 
+F, 
3M4565AN578

93
  1  @ 
A5L

95A
3
 
A5L3455A6578
5A3
   
The first section of the above proposition gives the optimal contract. We find that in the presence 
of favouritism positive monetary incentive is offered only when the return of the firm is 
sufficiently high and/or the utility from status is low. But the presence of favouritism makes the 
condition for paying a positive amount of monetary incentive more stringent. In fact the 
condition becomes increasingly stringent with an increase in µ and thus zero incentive bonus is 
likely the smaller is the favoured group size. Put differently favouritism acts as an additional 
incentive and relaxes the burden on financial incentive. Again, if the utility from status is 
sufficiently low then the principal has no other option but to offer positive bonus to elicit effort. 
Noteworthy is the fact that F1 increases with δ and therefore it is optimal for the principal to 
pay more incentive bonus to the agent with an increase in the benefit from favouritism (side 
payments). It can also be verified that F1 can be lower than 1 when the group size is small 
and return of the firm is low. We can rewrite the optimal bonus as F1   O5A
A63
3
5A 
µ5P
5µ
Q
 one can easily show that when @ R C then F1  1 since @ * 1. When the 
potentially favoured group size is large then the principal needs to compensate the agent with 
higher monetary incentive as the agents are exposed to lower probability of being selected as the 
favourite one. But if @  C and  * 783 
A5L
3A5A  
&
 then optimal bonus under favouritism will 
be lower than 1. Thus, when 783 
AM5365AN5L
35A   R  R
78
3 
A5L
3A5A
14
 and group size is 
small then it is optimal for the principal to offer positive yet a lower than 1 monetary 
incentive. Observe, <4
&
<A 

5A
 
L
A
5A
  0, which implies that the condition for paying 
lower bonus becomes more relaxed with the increase in the level of favouritism, whereas the 
condition becomes stringent with the increase in the benefit of the principal from favouritism. 
When the size of the group shrinks then each agent enjoys higher probability of receiving the 
appraisal and hence it becomes easier for the principal to exploit this fact and offer a lower pay. 
But the benefit of the principal from favouritism rises with the increase in incentive pay, hence 
the condition for lower payment is more stringent when C raises. Note that, similar to proposition 
1, when the signal is bad and the agent is not favoured, the monetary incentive can be set equal 
to zero since decreasing F0 will increase the probablity of success of the project.  The second 
part of the proposition gives the optimal effort which is a negative function of level of 
favouritism. When @ increases the agent is more reluctant to put in productive effort as they 
know that the probability of being selected as the favourite one is high and it is independent of 
their effort that they put in.15 Thus, we observe that even when the optimal effort level is lower 
than the benchmark effort level yet the principal can offer lower bonus when the group size is 
small and the return of the firm is low as well. To elicit desirable effort the principal offers 
higher (than benchmark case) bonus only when μ is smaller than C. Substituting the optimal 
                                                           
14The condition for positive bonus payment is     783 
µ5365µ5L
35µ , whereas, the condition for F1 * 1 
is  * &   783 
µ5L
3µ5µ. Therefore,  should lie between 
78
3 
µ5365µ5L
35µ  ,
78
3 
µ5L
3µ5µ] so that F1 is 
positive as well as less than 1. Thus, we need to check the validity of the range. For that, U783 
µ5L
3µ5µV 
U783 
µ5365µ5L
35µ  V   
µ5L
3µ  1  µshould be greater than zero. By assumption 2,  can be atmost equal to 
µ5L
µ5µ. Substituting the value of  in the above expression we get, 
µ5L5µ535µ
3µ5µ . If this expression is positive, 
then it is valid even for lower values of . But, for that, 2  µ  2-1  µmust hold. Note that ∆ can take the 
maximum value of unity when the signal is perfect and putting the maximum value in the above inequality we 
observe that it reduces to µ * 0, which is always true. Thus, the inequality holds for for every value of - and 
hence the range is valid.  
15
 Observe, when there is no favouritism within the firm (i.e., µ=0) then the  eXY&  ̂& 
bonus and effort in the expected utility function of the principal we get the third part of the 
proposition. It can be easily verified that when µ is set equal to zero then +,  +(,. But with 
positive level of favouritism, it is difficult to comprehend unambiguously whether the principal 
is better off or not. Thus, we observe that when the group size is small such that μ  C, it 
generates interesting results and therefore for tractability of the solutions we make the following 
assumptions:  
Assumption 1: 
 * 2@  C@2  @ 
 Assumption 2: 
C R @ R 2  C3
16
 
Technically put, assumption 1 ensures the feasibility of random favouritisn vis-à-vis no 
favoutitism and assumption 2 ensures that an interior solution in  exists. Further significance of 
the previous two assumptions will be made clear as we proceed. 
(Besley and Ghatak (2008) shows that there exists a constant degree of substitution between 
monetary and non-monetary incentive tools. In this framework also the degree of substitution 
remains same at the constant value of 3. Thus; even in presence of random favouritism the 
status plays the perfect role in reducing the burden on money bonus.   It should be observed that 
principal’s benefit from the use of status is positive   783 
<=>
<6  0 in the benchmark model. 
Even in the presence of favouritism and when @  C  0 with the increase in utility from 
status, the benefit of the principal increases to 1  @  785A3 
A5L
3  1  @
<=>
<6 
A5L
3  0.) 
Given the above assumptions we can now state the following proposition: 
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 Note that 
?L
[  C 
21C
3
 0.Thus, µ lies within a valid range. 
Proposition 3:  
Random favouritism will be beneficial for the principal if 
 * \  5A

36A36A5578?5AA5L5A36?78?A5L

35A35A6A?A5L  .                                                 (1) 
Proof: It is straightforward to check that  +F,  +,  0 given the above condition. QED.  
The above proposition says that if the return of the firm is not very high only then it is beneficial 
for the principal to indulge in favouritism. Assumption 1 is the sufficient condition for the 
critical value of  to be positive. The upper limit of µ (given in the assumption 2) ensures that 
\ * 1. The logic behind this result can be cited as follows: random favouritism might lead to 
inappropriate disbursement of incentives which may induce the agent in choosing lower level of 
effort. But, at the same time random favouritism ensures that the principal receives an additional 
payoff out of favouritism. Suppose that the additional benefit accounts for the reduced cost 
which the principal otherwise had to incur for performance evaluation. For a low return firm this 
cost saving (in this example) is substantial vis-à-vis a high return firm. Put differently for a low-
return firm the loss accruing from low probability of the success of the project is outweighed by 
the gain that the principal enjoys from the saved cost of performance evaluation17. Thus, even 
though the principal of the low return firm faces a lower probability of success due to the 
presence of favouritism but the benefit out of favouritism ensures that indulging in favouritism is 
beneficial. For a high return firm the cost of performance evaluation may be considerably 
insignificant compared to the scale of profit that they earn, hence it is not beneficial for those 
firms to indulge in some kind of favouritism. 
Bramoullé and Goyal (2009) have explored that favouritism is relatively easier to sustain in 
smaller groups, whereas, Breuer et al. (2011) have empirically validated the fact that an upward 
bias of the supervisor persists when the group size is small. This proposition states that together 
with the fact that favouritism is sustainable in small group size, the return of the firm has to be 
low for the existence of favouritism as an optimal outcome. Thus, we find an interesting result 
which relates the return of a firm to participation in the act of favouritism. 
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 The logic holds through even when the additional utility from favouritism arises out of side payment made by the 
agent or the psychological benefit which the principal gains out of favouritism. 
3.1. Informativeness of the Output Signal: Implications: 
Through our model we try to comprehend how the use of status and monetary incentives change 
in the presence of random favouritism. To understand which firm benefits the most from the use 
of status we find that for firms with higher returns, marginal increment in principal’s expected 
payoff from status is higher18. Even for firms where favouritism prevails we find that the firm’s 
marginal benefit from using status incentive increases with an increase in the returns of the firm 
that is, 
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            The model also predicts how the informativeness of the signal affects the use of status 
incentives. To observe more clearly we normalize     1 and let  ^ #  1  . This 
implies that higher is the value of #  less informative is the signal as a measure of output. We 
find that <
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when @ is sufficiently large19. Therefore, when the output is harder to verify the marginal gain 
from introducing status incentives is greater in the presence of favouritism vis-à-vis when there 
is no favouritism, given that the favoured group size is small. The intuition is that when output is 
difficult to verify then bonus acts as an inefficient and costly instrument to elicit effort. So status 
incentive increases the effort level of the agent and at the same time reduces the burden on 
monetary incentive (i.e. bonus). Thus when the signal is less informative, the principal’s utility 
increases from the use of status incentive. But in the presence of favouritism the marginal gain 
from status incentives is lower since status is now  conferred not only on the basis of output but 
also on a random component arising from favouritism. Again, when the favoured group size is 
small (@ is large) it ensures that the principal can offer lower incentive bonus. Thus, when we 
compare the degree of gain from status incentive due to increase in non-verifiability between 
both the cases, we observe that the gain from offering lower bonus (when @ is large) outweighs 
the loss out of lower marginal benefit from status incentive in presence of favouritism. We can 
record this above stated facts as: 
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 This finding echoes the result established in Besley and Ghatak (2008).  
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Proposition 4: 
The principal’s marginal return from status incentives is higher for high-return firms. This 
marginal increment in payoff is lower in the presence of favouritism.  
When the output is harder to verify the principal’s gain from using status incentive increases. 
The magnitude of this gain increases in presence of favouritism for smaller group size. 
Proof: Follows from above discussion. QED 
It is also interesting to understand the effect of use of status incentive in presence of favouritism. 
It can be shown that 
<
=]>
<6<A   
78
3 

3. Now for 
<
=]>
<6<A to be positive we need  *
578
3   . 
Under perfect signal20 this condition reduces to  * 1 which holds true through out the model. 
Hence under perfect signal the principal’s benefit from using status incentive increases when 
degree of favouritism increases. When the potentially favoured group size shrinks (i.e. @ 
increrases) then the principal optimally offers lower monetary incentive. Together with this fact, 
the use of status incentive reduces the burden on monetary payoff even further and at the same 
time increases effort. Thus, the principal’s gain from use of status incentive is reinforced with the 
increase in the degree of favouritism. But, with the decrease in the informativeness of the signal, 
monetary incentive becomes dearer and inefficient as well. Hence, with the increase in non-
verifiability of output gain from offering low bonus on account of increase in @ is dampened. 
Therefore, when the signal is more informative the principal’s gain from status increases with the 
rise in level (degree) of favouritism.  
This result can be stated formally in the following. 
Proposition 5: 
When the signal is more informative then the principal’s benefit from status incentive increases 
with the level of favouritism.   
Proof: Follows from above discussion. QED. 
                                                           
20
 Perfect signal implies  ` 0 and  ` 1 and hence - ` 1 
It is also interesting to check the effect of non-verifiability of output on principal’s payoff with 
and without favouritism. For both the situations we can easily derive from the principal’s payoff 
function that principal benefits more with the decrease in informativeness of the signal, given 
that the return of the firm is sufficiently low. A critical observation into the range of  for which 
non-verifiability of output is beneficial for the principal reveals that, for both the situations, this 
range is similar to that where it is optimal for the principal to offer zero monetary bonus.  
Corollary: 
When the return of the firm is sufficiently low the principal’s benefit increases with non-
verifiability of output.  
For both with and without favouritism, the principal’s expected payoff increases from non-
verifiability only when zero bonus is paid to the agent. Therefore, the gain accounts solely from 
the use of status incentive. Though, with the increase in return of the firm it is optimal to offer 
positive bonus, but when imperfection of signal increases, monetary incentive is no more an 
efficient instrument to elicit effort. Therefore, the gain out of non-verifiability of output 
decreases with the increase in return of the firm.  
3.2. Random Favouritism under Perfect Signal: 
When signal is perfect it indicates that the signal provides the correct information about the 
outcome of the project, in other words, output is verifiable. Under this situation,   0 and 
   1, therefore -      1. Then the condition for principal to involve in favouritism 
reduces to  
 * X  5A

6
AA5?5A
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Assumption 1 ensures that X * 121. Now, it is easy to observe that under perfect signal the 
principal has to offer a positive monetary incentive of  aF&1   
455A6
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 0 when 
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 For X * 1 we need to show that µ1  µµ  2  2 * 2µ  C1  1  µ  µ5L


5µ .Since 0 R µ R 1, 
therefore the LHS is negative. From assumption 2 C R @ R ?L[ . The inequality holds for the lower limit value of µ, 
i.e., when µ  C, then the RHS is zero and hence the inequality holds. But for the higher value of µ the inequality 
    AM565AN5L5A  and the optimal effort reduces to ̂F
&  1  @baF&1  c. Thus, under 
perfect signal the monetary incentive which is offered to the agent is greater than F1 and the 
condition for positive payment is also more relaxed. It is also optimal for the agent to elicit 
higher effort. 
From the reduced condition for existence of favouritism we can predict some interesting results 
which are stated as follows: 
 Proposition 6: 
I. When the benefit from status increases then favouritism becomes less beneficial to the 
principal. 
II. As the favoured group size falls the principal is more likely to indulge in favouritism.   
 
The first part of the proposition states that when  increases the RHS of inequality (2) falls, this 
indicates that the condition for existence of favouritism is now more stringent. When the 
valuation of status increases the principal can ensure that the agent elicits desired effort even at 
lower monetary incentive. But when the principal indulges in favouritism then she gets back a 
fraction of the optimal bonus as additional benefit from exercising favouritism. Thus, when the 
optimal payment is low, it implies that the additional benefit is also low. This negative effect is 
greater for high return firms. This implies that firms with sufficiently low return are the one who 
can still benefit from favouritism22 and hence the result.  
The second part reveals that with the increase in @ the critical level of  increases, which 
indicates that favouritism is now feasible for firms with a larger level of return23. If the favoured 
group size is small then the agent faces a higher probability of being favoured. Therefore the 
principal can optimally offer a lower bonus and still make the agent accept the contract. This is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reduces to  * dL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 hL59 * 0, since C  0,1. Thus, for the maximum value of µ, the inequality is maintained by assumption 
1 itself and hence X * 1.. 
22
 Since compared to their level of return the gain from favouritism is still large. 
23
 The condition for favouritism is now relaxed with the increase in the level of favouritism 
the positive effect of an increased @. But this lower bonus also reduces the gain from favouritism 
for the principal. The positive effect of an increase in @ dominates the negative effect and 
favouritism per se becomes relatively more profitable.  
4. Conclusion:  
In this paper we explore the situation under which it is beneficial for the principal to indulge in 
favouritism in offering monetary and status incentives. By favouritism we mean random 
favouritism where as if the principal has a potentially favoured group of agents from which 
he/she in an impartial manner selects a particular agent24. In this structure we examine the 
associated change in the optimal incentive scheme in the presence of random favouritism. Using 
a moral hazard framework with limited liability we show that the optimal effort level reduces 
and the optimal monetary incentive decreases when favoured group size is small. It is also 
derived that the principal can benefit from indulging in favouritism (even if random favouritism) 
if return of the firm is sufficiently low. Though Bramoullé and Goyal (2009) and Breuer et al. 
(2011) has shown that it is easy to sustain favouritism in smaller group size, this paper suggests 
that together with a small size of favoured group, the return of the firm has to be low for 
favouritism to be beneficial for the principal and therefore to be an optimal outcome. Thus, an 
interesting result is generated which relates the level of return of a firm and the existence of 
favouritism. For a low return firm, the benefit out of favouritism may be considerably significant 
compared to the scale of profit that they earn and hence, in spite of the success probability 
(depends on agents effort) going down due to the presence of favouritism, it is beneficial for 
those firms to indulge into favouritism. We have also examined how the change in level of 
favouritism affects the marginal benefit from status incentive and how it is affected with changes 
in the verifiability of output. As an extension we have analyzed how changes in parameters like 
level of favouritism, valuation of status affects the condition for existence of favouritism, when 
the output is verifiable.  
This paper contributes to the literature which captures the positive view of favouritism and show 
that under certain situations the principal (and hence an organization) is better off indulging in 
favouritism. Like Prendergast and Topel (1996), Prendergast (2002), Berger et al. (2011) we 
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 To some extent similar to Chen (2010).  
have also assumed that the principal receives an additional benefit from indulging in favouritism. 
This paper also incorporates the fact that even when the principal does not exercise her 
discretionary power to select an agent from the favoured group and therefore selects randomly 
then also she can derive some benefit out of it. The benefit can arise out of an expected side 
payment by the agent and/or from reduced cost of performance evaluation and/or from an 
expected psychological pleasure. But unlike Kwon (2006), here favouritism arises due to 
exogenous reasons. Kwon (2006) has shown that favouritism can arise even if the principal does 
not exercise her preferential bias. It can arise endogenously depending on the motivation of the 
agent and they show that favouritism dominates fairness. Similar positive view point on 
favouritism has also been captured by Arya and Glover (2003). 
Some extentions can be worked out in the future. So far, we have worked on a model where 
favouritism is exogenous. In the future, we intended to endogenize favouritism and analyze the 
associated economic consequences. Further, it would interesting to examine how the analysis 
changes if the principal indulges in some form of directed favouritism (favouring a specific 
agent) in a multiple agent framework. 
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